Pakistan Reader# 494, 2 January 2023
D. Suba Chandran
The most important question in 2023 will be the general election for the national assembly and four provincial assemblies. What will be the nature of the results, and how much will the losers accept them? While Imran Khan wants early elections during March-April, the coalition government led by the PML-N and PPP would want to hold as per schedule – during the later part of the year. The three provinces – Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, are less likely to be a challenge; however, Punjab will be. Both the PML-N and PTI are likely to fight it out in Punjab; what happens in Punjab will decide the post-election government in Islamabad at the federal level and its acceptability by the loser.
Second, the Establishment’s role – before, during and after the elections vis-à-vis the political parties: will it remain neutral? During the last election in 2018, the Establishment was with the PTI and Imran Khan before, during and in the immediate aftermath of the elections. The fallout between the two took place during the last year. How will the Deep State look at not only the major parties, but also the smaller ones – the MQM in Karachi, PML-Q and the Tehreek-e-Labbaik-Pakistan (TLP) in Punjab will also be a factor. The above will also decide the nature of civil-military relations in 2023.
Third, the most important domestic question internally after the elections will be: what to do with the TTP? Should it be completely neutralized, or should it be politically dealt with, or should there be a “here-and-there” strategy involving carrots and sticks? Despite the recent brave statements at the NSC meeting and the discussion at the corps commanders’ level, Pakistan’s approach towards the TTP will be a major issue. It is a major issue, because there is no consensus within the Parliament and also between the Parliament and the GHQ.
Fourth is an internal question, with external inputs: how to shore up Pakistan’s economy. Should it be done with the IMF requirements or without it? The government, facing the elections, is apprehensive about taking the IMF-prescribed pills. Without those, the economy cannot be shored up in 2023 unless the “friendly” countries step in. Despite the rhetoric, it did not happen in 2022. Though there was some support from China, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it was not sufficient. Even if these three contribute in 2023, it will still not be sufficient. The million-dollar question in front of Pakistan’s finance and prime ministers is: Can Pakistan get out of the economic mess without yielding to the IMF requirements?
The fifth question is external – dealing with the big powers – especially three: how to balance China, the US and Russia? Despite the recent statements, the US-Pakistan relationship has not revived during the post-Imran period. The slide started during Trump’s period; the American exit from Afghanistan and the Ukraine War has shifted Washington’s priorities. Will Pakistan move more towards China and Russia in 2023? It is happening already, but Islamabad (and Rawalpindi as well) would still want to have open communication with the US.
The sixth question is also external but linked with an internal issue: how to deal with Kabul and the Afghan Taliban? There is a predominant expectation that the Taliban should be thankful and grateful to Pakistan. And totally control the TTP. And ensure that the Durand Line is accepted and remains peaceful. None of the above three happened in 2022. And is not likely to in 2023.
Seventh question is internal: how to deal with the violence and protests in Balochistan? In 2022, the province witnessed three kinds of violence – anti-State led by the Baloch groups, anti-sectarian violence, and resource-based protest in Gwadar. China’s presence and the CPEC project further complicate the resource-based demands in Gwadar.
.png)
.png)
.png)
.png)
.png)
.png)
.png)
.png)
.png)
.png)
.png)
.png)
.png)
.png)
.jpg)
Matiari-Lahoretransmissionlinei.jpg){kind=spacer}
